《哲学史-philosophy of history(英文版)》philosophy of history(英文版)-第19章

exercise　in　the　sphere　of　particular　and　limited　desires。
§　41
Subjective　volition　…　Passion　…　is　that　which　sets　men　in　activity；　that　which　effects　〃practical〃
realisation。　The　Idea　is　the　inner　spring　of　action；　the　State　is　the　actually；　existing；　realised　moral
life。　For　it　is　the　Unity　of　the　universal；　essential　Will；　with　that　of　the　individual；　and　this　is
〃Morality。〃　The　Individual　living　in　this　unity　has　a　moral　life；　possesses　a　value　that　consists　in　this
substantiality　alone。　Sophocles　in　his　Antigone；　says；　〃The　divine　mands　are　not　of　yesterday；
nor　of　today；　no；　they　have　an　infinite　existence；　and　no　one　could　say　whence　they　came。〃　The
laws　of　morality　are　not　accidental；　but　are　the　essentially　Rational。　It　is　the　very　object　of　the
State　that　what　is　essential　in　the　practical　activity　of　men；　and　in　their　dispositions；　should　be　duly
recognised；　that　it　should　have　a　manifest　existence；　and　maintain　its　position。　It　is　the　absolute
interest　of　Reason　that　this　moral　Whole　should　exist；　and　herein　lies　the　justification　and　merit　of
heroes　who　have　founded　states；　…　however　rude　these　may　have　been。　In　the　history　of　the
World。；　only　those　peoples　can　e　under　our　notice　which　form　a　state。　For　it　must　be
understood　that　this　latter　is　the　realisation　of　Freedom；　i。e。　of　the　absolute　final　aim；　and　that　it
exists　for　its　own　sake。　It　must　further　be　understood　that　all　the　worth　which　the　human　being
possesses　…　all　spiritual　reality；　he　possesses　only　through　the　State。　For　his　spiritual　reality　consists
in　this；　that　his　own　essence　…　Reason　…　is　objectively　present　to　him；　that　it　possesses　objective
immediate　existence　for　him。　Thus　only　is　he　fully　conscious；　thus　only　is　he　a　partaker　of　morality　…
of　a　just　and　moral　social　and　political　life。　For　Truth　is　the　Unity　of　the　universal　and　subjective
Will；　and　the　Universal　is　to　be　found　in　the　State；　in　its　laws；　its　universal　and　rational
arrangements。　The　State　is　the　Divine　Idea　as　it　exists　on　Earth。　We　have　in　it；　therefore；　the
object　of　History　in　a　more　definite　shape　than　before；　that　in　which　Freedom　obtains　objectivity；
and　lives　in　the　enjoyment　of　this　objectivity。　For　Law　is　the　objectivity　of　Spirit；　volition　in　its　true
form。　Only　that　will　which　obeys　law；　is　free；　for　it　obeys　itself　…　it　is　independent　and　so　free。
When　the　State　or　our　country　constitutes　a　munity　of　existence；　when　the　subjective　will　of
man　submits　to　laws；　…　the　contradiction　between　Liberty　and　Necessity　vanishes。　The　Rational
has　necessary　existence　as　being　the　reality　and　substance　of　things；　and　we　are　free　in　recognising
it　as　law；　and　following　it　as　the　substance　of　our　own　being。　The　objective　and　the　subjective　will
are　then　reconciled；　and　present　one　identical　homogeneous　whole。　For　the　morality　（Sittlichkeit）
of　the　State　is　not　of　that　ethical　（moralische）　reflective　kind；　in　which　one"s　own　conviction　bears
sway；　this　latter　is　rather　the　peculiarity　of　the　modern　time；　orality　is　based
on　the　principle　of　abiding　by　one"s　duty　＇to　the　state　at　large＇。　An　Athenian　citizen　did　what　was
required　of　him；　as　it　were　from　instinct；　but　if　I　reflect　on　the　object　of　nay　activity；　I　must　have
the　consciousness　that　my　will　has　been　called　into　exercise。　But　morality　is　Duty　…　substantial
Right　…　a　〃second　nature〃　as　it　has　been　justly　called；　for　the　first　nature　of　man　is　his　primary
merely　animal　existence。　
§　42
The　development　in　extenso　of　the　Idea　of　the　State　belongs　to　the　Philosophy　of　Right；　but　it
must　be　observed　that　in　the　theories　of　our　time　various　errors　are　current　respecting　it；　which
pass　for　established　truths；　and　have　bee　fixed　prejudices。　We　will　mention　only　a　few　of
them；　giving　prominence　to　such　as　have　a　reference　to　the　object　of　our　history。　The　error　which
first　meets　us　is　the　direct　contradictory　of　our　principle　that　the　state　presents　the　realisation　of
Freedom；　the　opinion；　viz。；　that　man　is　free　by　nature；　but　that　in　society；　in　the　State　…　to　which
nevertheless　he　is　irresistibly　impelled　…　he　must　limit　this　natural　freedom。　That　man　is　free　by
Nature　is　quite　correct　in　one　sense；　viz。；　that　he　is　so　according　to　the　Idea　of　Humanity；　but　we
imply　thereby　that　lie　is　such　only　in　virtue　of　his　destiny　…　that　he　has　an　undeveloped　power　to
bee　such；　for　the　〃Nature〃　of　an　object　is　exactly　synonymous　with　its　〃Idea。〃　But　the　view　in
question　imports　more　than　this。　When　man　is　spoken　of　as　〃free　by　Nature；〃　the　mode　of　his
existence　as　well　as　his　destiny　is　implied。　His　merely　natural　and　primary　condition　is　intended。　In
this　sense　a　〃state　of　Nature〃　is　assumed　in　which　mankind　at　large　are　in　the　possession　of　their
natural　rights　with　the　unconstrained　exercise　and　enjoyment　of　their　freedom。　This　assumption　is
not　indeed　raised　to　the　dignity　of　the　historical　fact；　it　would　indeed　be　difficult；　were　the　attempt
seriously　made；　to　point　out　any　such　condition　as　actually　existing；　or　as　having　ever　occurred。
Examples　of　a　savage　state　of　life　can　be　pointed　out；　but　they　are　marked　by　brutal　passions　and
deeds　of　violence；　while；　however　rude　and　simple　their　conditions；　they　involve　social
arrangements　which　（to　use　the　mon　phrase）　restrain　freedom。　That　assumption　is　one　of
those　nebulous　images　which　theory　produces；　an　idea　which　it　cannot　avoid　originating；　but　which
it　fathers　upon　real　existence；　without　sufficient　historical　justification。　
§　43
What　we　find　such　a　state　of　Nature　to　be　in　actual　experience；　answers　exactly　to　the　Idea　of　a
merely　natural　condition。　Freedom　as　the　ideal　of　that　which　is　original　and　natural；　does　not　exist
as　original　and　natural。　Rather　must　it　be　first　sought　out　and　won；　and　that　by　an　incalculable
medial　discipline　of　the　intellectual　and　moral　powers。　The　state　of　Nature　is；　therefore；
predominantly　that　of　injustice　and　violence；　of　untamed　natural　impulses；　of　inhuman　deeds　and
feelings。　Limitation　is　certainty　produced　by　Society　and　the　State；　but　it　is　a　limitation　of　the　m